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FLEET v. FLEET
vice" in any court of record in the State of Maryland ex-
cept on non-resident motorists" for causes of action arising
in this State and corporations doing business in the State. 5
MARRIAGE PERFORMED BY TELEPHONE INVALID
Fleet v. Fleet'
The plaintiff, a member of the armed forces, was sta-
tioned in Oklahoma, and, being alerted for overseas ser-
vice, could not return to Baltimore, Maryland. It was his
desire to do so to wed the defendant, who had given birth,
out of wedlock, to the plaintiff's child in May, 1943. It was
arranged between the parties that they be married by tele-
phone, with the plaintiff in Oklahoma and the defendant
in Baltimore, Maryland. The defendant procured a license
in Baltimore on February 5, 1944, and on February 7,
1944, the parties conversed with one another by telephone
and the minister in Baltimore read the marriage ceremony
to the parties, to the plaintiff in Oklahoma over the tele-
phone, with the defendant standing beside the minister
in Baltimore. The marriage was never consummated. On
the contrary, when the plaintiff did return home, he found
the defendant again pregnant, and she confessed that the
plaintiff was not the father of the prospective child. The
plaintiff then filed a bill asking for a divorce a vinculo
matrimonii on the ground of adultery, or, in the alter-
native, for an annulment of the purported marriage on the
ground that it was void ab.initio.
The Court granted an annulment of the purported mar-
riage, saying that a marriage by telephone could not be
valid in Maryland. The Court decided to apply the law
of Maryland to the problem of whether or not this was a
valid marriage, and in doing so found that it was not. To
constitute a lawful marriage in this state, it is necessary
to have a religious ceremony in addition to the civil con-
tract between the parties, and a proper religious ceremony
necessarily contemplates the presence of both parties be-
1 Equity rule 10A permits notice by registered mail to defendants in
divorce cases (see, Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, Sec. 167) as does the recently
enacted rule of the Court of Appeals upon makers of confessed judgment
notes (Baltimore Daily Record, Nov. 20, 1947). These two instances, how-
ever, can be distinguished by the very nature of the case, as the Court
has in rem or in personam jurisdiction and the service by registered mail
is merely a form of notice that action is being taken.1, Md. Code Supp. (1943) Art. 66%, Sec. 106.15 Md. Code (1939) Art. 23, Sec. 111.
2 Ct. Ct. No. 2 of Baltimore City, Baltimore Daily Record, October 23, 1946.
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fore the minister. There being no lawful religious cere-
mony, then there was no valid marriage.
The Master's report, which the Court in its opinion ap-
proved, stated that this particular Equity Court, under its
general equity power, had jurisdiction to annul this mar-
riage. This means that the Court had jurisdiction over the
subject matter before it. The general equity power re-
ferred to above is that power of the Equity Court to rescind
or reform any civil contract for defects concerned with
intention and consent, such as fraud, duress, insanity and
intoxication.2 The theory of a marriage in Maryland is
that it is a civil contract entered into by the parties and
that the parties marry themselves by their contractual
offer and acceptance.' Thus if any impediment exist to
prevent the intent to contract by the parties to a marriage,
the Equity Court would have jurisdiction to declare it void.
A question might have been raised concerning the
source of power in the Court to annul for this particular
impediment, i. e., lack of sufficient ceremony. In an article
earlier published in the Review, it was said: "The avail-
ability of the general procedure for annulment in equity
is doubtful unless lack of formality be considered one of
the contract impediments for which that annulment route
is available".4 The Court apparently felt that the lack of
a valid religious ceremony was such an impediment to a
marriage contract, as did give Maryland Equity Courts
power to annul the marriage, and probably rightfully so.
The theory is that a proper religious ceremony is neces-
sary to show the required intent for a valid contract of
marriage between the parties. The question has never
been decided by the Court of Appeals, although under the
subsequent legislation mentioned below, the point is now
clarified.
The territorial jurisdiction of the Maryland Equity
Courts to annul has never been definitely defined by the
Court of Appeals of Maryland either. That Court has im-
pliedly ruled, in previous cases, that the Courts of this
state could annul marriages if the parties were domiciled
here at the time of the annulment proceedings,5 or (possi-
2 LeBrun v. LeBrun, 55 Md. 496 (1880) ; Ridgely v. Ridgely, 79 Md. 298,
29 A. 597 (1894) ; Samuelson v. Samuelson, 155 Md. 639, 142 A. 97 (1928) ;
Elfont v. Elfont, 161 Md. 458, 157 A. 741 (1931) ; Montgomery v. U'Nertle,
143 Md. 200, 122 A. 357 (1923).
8 Strahorn, Void and Voidable Marriages in Maryland and Their Annul-
ment (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 211.
' Ibid, 224.
5Fensterwald v. Burk, 129 Md. 131, 98 A. 358 (1916) ; Elfont v. Elfont,
161 Md. 458, 157 A. 741 (1931).
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bly) if they have personal jurisdiction over the parties at
the time of the proceedings,6 and they have taken juris-
diction when the marriage ceremony was performed here.7
All three of these conditions existed in this case before
the Baltimore Circuit Court No. 2. What ceremony there
was took place in Maryland, the parties were domiciled
here at the time, and the defendant was personally served.
The Court then clearly, under the implied rulings of our
Court of Appeals, had territorial jurisdiction over the
marriage and the parties.
Since the time of this case, the Maryland Legislature
has amended the annulment laws of the State so as to
clarify the territorial jurisdiction point theretofore in
doubt, and this clarifying legislation is discussed elsewhere
in this issue of the REVIEW.7a
The next question that presented itself to the Court,
and probably presents itself to the reader, is one of con-
flict of laws. Which state's law should be applied in deter-
mining the validity of the marriage, the law of Maryland
or the law of Oklahoma? The grounds for the annulment
should be determined according to the law of the state
whose law determined the validity of the marriage; that
is the place of celebration, subject to the exception that
the public policy of the forum might make such marriage
void no matter where performed.' A marriage valid where
performed is valid in the State of Maryland, unless it vio-
lates our public policy.9 Under the rule just stated it is
submitted that even if the Maryland court had applied
Oklahoma law, it would have reached the same result. In
spite of statutes in Oklahoma which require a ceremony'0
and a license" before the parties become married, the
courts of that state have held that a common-law marriage
which takes place there is valid.' But, for a valid com-
mon-law marriage in Oklahoma, it is necessary that parties
capable of entering into the marital relation agree to be,
and hold themselves out as husband and wife, and in the
pursuance of such agreement that cohabitation take
6 Corder v. Corder, 141 Md. 114, 117 A. 119 (1922).
7Ibid. See also, Montgomery v. U'Nertle, supra, n. 2.
7,Comment, Annulment Jurisdiction Clarified (1948) 9 Md. L. Rev. 63.
s RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, Sec. 136.
o Jackson v. Jackson, 80 Md. 176, 30 A. 752 (1894) ; Whitehurst v. White-
hurst, 156 Md. 610, 145 A. 204 (1928).
10 Okla. Stat. (1941) Title 43, Sec. 7.
11 Okla. Stat. (1941) Title 43, Sec. 4.
12 In re Love's Estate, 42 Okla. 478, 142 Pac. 305 (1914).
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place. 3 From the evidence in this case, it is quite clear
that no cohabitation took place in Oklahoma, the wife
never having left Maryland; so, no valid common-law
marriage could have been completed in compliance with
Oklahoma law. Even if the parties had later cohabited in
Maryland, which they did not in this case, that would not
have been sufficient for a valid common-law marriage in
Oklahoma. All of the essential elements of celebration
must be performed at the place of celebration before the
parties become legally married there.
What would the result be if the Oklahoma law did
recognize a common law marriage simply by an agreement
of the parties without the further requirement of co-
habitation. Some states and foreign countries recognize
marriages by offer and acceptance through the mails. The
law is that a marriage by means of mutual consent given
by letter or other means of securing consent between per-
sons in different places is valid everywhere if it is valid
by the law of the state from which the acceptance is dis-
patched."4 This is the same as the general rule applicable
to ordinary contracts; the place of making the contract
is that place where the acceptance is posted. 5 If the Okla-
homa law were as stated above, the question in the Fleet
case would then arise which party made the offer and
which posted the acceptance. If the wife made the offer
and the husband posted his acceptance in Oklahoma, then
the contract was made in Oklahoma and the law of that
state would be applied, and the marriage would be valid.
On the other hand, if the husband made the offer and
the wife posted her acceptance by phone in Maryland,
then the contract was made in Maryland, and the law of
this state should be applied; and the marriage held invalid.
If the Court were unable to find from the facts where the
acceptance was posted, then the law of Maryland, the state
of domicile of the parties should be applied and the mar-
riage held invalid. Where there is proof of a marriage,
although it is not possible to determine within a reason-
able degree of probability where the contract was effectu-
ated, the law of the domicile of the parties will govern as
to its validity.6
It is felt that the Maryland court was right in applying
its own law to this marriage; for certainly the State of
11 Hughes v. Kano, 68 Okla. 203, 173 Pac. 447 (1918) ; Draughn v. State,
12 Okla. Cr. App. 479, 158 Pac. 890 (1916) ; Palmer v. Cully, 52 Okla. 454,
153 Pac. 154 (1915).
1, Supra, n. 8.
25 11 Am. Jur., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Sec. 115.10 38 C. J. MARRIAGE, Sec. 6.
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Maryland had sufficient contacts with the parties and the
ceremony to say that this was an attempted Maryland
contract. The parties, plaintiff and defendant, were domi-
cifliaries of Maryland, as well as the child that was bastard-
ized by the annulment of the purported marriage. If any
marital domicile could be said to exist, then certainly that
was in Maryland. All the evidence points to the intention
of the parties to be married in Maryland in compliance
with the laws of this state. They secured a license from
the Clerk of the Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore, and
the certificate of marriage signed by the minister was re-
turned to, and filed in, that office. Such ceremony as was
conducted took place in Maryland; the parties had the
minister present in Maryland as required by state statute, 7
and everything that was done in the way of conducting a
marriage ceremony, was done in Maryland. The only con-
tact that Oklahoma had was the plaintiff's presence there,
and his saying of his part of the ceremony took place there.
The State of Maryland, therefore, had the most interest
in the relationship of the parties as to their marital status;
and, that, coupled with the fact that Maryland was the
place of attempted celebration, was quite sufficient to give
the court jurisdiction to annul and to apply their own
law in doing so.
This state and any others have a right to decide for
themselves their regulations and requirements for a valid
marriage within their limits." Maryland has decided that
to constitute a valid marriage, there must be superadded
to the civil contract a religious ceremony. 19 The Court in
this case felt that a religious ceremony as intended by this
state contemplated the presence of both parties before the
minister, which did not occur. The reason for the religious
ceremony is that it gives solemnity to the acts of the
parties. It shows a seriousness of intent to be married, and
without the presence of both parties, that indication of in-
tent is lost. Further, the fact of the ceremony gives evi-
dence that the marriage exists; that is, it is evidence of the
contract, and prevents fraud as to the parties to it. If both
parties are present before the minister, there is much less
possibility of fraud by substitution of parties, or other-
wise. As all of the elements necessary to a religious cere-
mony were not present, the Court was justified in voiding
this marriage.
17 Md. Code (1939) Art. 62, Sec. 4.
18 State v. Clay, 182 Md. 639, 35 A. 2d 821 (1944).
19 Denison v. Denison, 35 Md. 361 (1872).
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